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Whatever its other defects, the term "experimental" has, at least in the 
last few decades, been usefully vague. It's not expected to describe a spe- 
cific practice with any accuracy. It's enough that it point at numerous, 
loosely knit, formal and topical characteristics. Its job is to do some ini- 
tial sorting by referring to some provinces of artistic production and not 
others. What the word lacks in precision it makes up for in convenience. 
More precision would only impair its utilitarian value. In addition to 
casual conversations about art and film, it stays busy in more institutional 
sites, like distributor's catalogues, university and art school courses, and 
festival application forms, where it helps organize large numbers of 
diverse works in a small number of categories. There it is often used as a 
depository for works that would be misrepresented in some other large, 
equally vague category, like "fiction" or "documentary." 
The instrumental value of the term has not always silenced its detractors. 
In the 1920s, van Doesburg, himself well known for his seemingly experi- 
mental attitudes, derided "mere experimentalists" for their "fantasies." Film 
historian Sheldon Renan, writing about work that many would feel com- 
fortable calling experimental, rejected the term, seeing in it a misleading 
emphasis on "trial and error" which privileges "logical inquiry" over "per- 
sonal expression." He also cited artists who object to the perceived insinua- 
tion that experimental films are by nature "incomplete." The problems with 
terms that are usefully vague become clear the moment anyone breaks the 
unspoken agreement not to question too deeply what is actually meant. 
Van Doesburg, however, was making an important distinction that 
continues to  resonate today. When he attacked experimenters, he was 
attacking experimentation-for-its-own-sake, unaccompanied by other 
political or aesthetic goals. His own innovations, on the other hand, were 
aggressively designed to challenge artistic and cultural values with which 
he disagreed, in order to replace them with his own. Artists commonly 
developed programs of work, often accompanied by theoretical writings 
or manifestos. The doctrines and the artworks were part of a larger 
experimental apparatus. Laissez-faire experimental art practices without 
doctrinal ambitions, Van Doesburg would contend, were simply unable to 
contribute to historical debates or progress in any meaningful way. What- 
ever one otherwise makes of this contention, an important distinction has 
been established, with particular relevance for artists working in emerging 
technologies. Experimentation can be self-justifying, having no other pur- 
pose than to keep its particular discipline healthy through a sustained 
program of innovation, or its accomplishments as innovation are means 
by which other possibly non-aesthetic goals are attained. 
Innovation is the minimal semantic requirement of the concept, if not 
the practice, of experimentalism. Modernist experimentation was typi- 
cally more conscious about the process and importance of innovation, 
committed as it was to the "new." Paul Griffiths points out, for example, 
that for the German avant-garde composer Karlheinz Stockhausen, it 
would have been "unthinkable" to repeat himself, and that the "new and 
untried" constituted a self-justifying aesthetic program.' John Cage called 
an experimental situation "one in which nothing is selected in advance, in 
which there are no obligations or prohibitions, in which nothing is even 
predictable."Z It is not clear that contemporary work, most of which is 
carefully constructed and has a very specific result and audience in mind, 
would pass Cage's criteria. Today, innovation, while appreciated, is not a 
necessary component of an experimental work, and is not especially visi- 
ble as an aesthetic or political value. An experimental work might be 
innovative, but most, being largely familiar in both formal design as well 
as topical concern, are not. Artists clearly have other concerns. Van Does- 
burg, himself a type of militant experimentalist, could denounce laissez- 
faire experimentalism at a time when it was common for artists to frame 
their work competitively and programmatically. (The criteria were not 
always obvious. His targets included Lissitzky and Rodchenko, who 
might as easily, it would seem, have reversed the accusation.) Doctrinal 
conflicts were then out in the open. Today, when doctrinal conflict rarely 
heats up beyond a comfortable room temperature-indeed, the critical 
calm which currently prevails over the art world is bizarre in many ways 
-such differences and disagreements quietly recede into the background. 
Yet values of innovation and newness continue to circulate in experi- 
mental circles, if in a reduced way, making it reasonable to ask why a 
work would be labelled experimental if it does not test new avenues of 
thought and work. Experimental media is primarily identified by a now 
familiar set of stylistic devices and topical concerns. But by isolating and 
identifying experimentalism as a set of recognizable conventions, the out- 
lines of a genre are established. And, like any other genre, within this one 
there are innovations, and innovators. Following a logic that produced 
the sub-categories "experimental" documentaries and "experimental" 
narratives, we may yet have a need for "experimental" experimental. 
The contemporary "new" is different from the modernist "new." Being 
not absolute but relative, contemporary newness is a secondary or subor- 
dinate value, a variation or modification of existing themes and practices. 
A new work or practice is not brand new, it is a new something-or-other, 
the something-or-other being already there. This newer, adjectival new is 
non-competitive, refraining from making the triumphalist claim that it 
consigns other, now "older" or obsolete forms to the ashcan of history. In 
his seminal book "Experimental Music,'! Michael Nyman stated that ask- 
ing what was experimental about experimental music was both "futile" 
and "tortured."3 It's hard to disagree (even if Nyman then proceeded to 
produce a rigorous definition of experimental music, distinguishing it 
from its avant-garde counterparts). For those who endorse the cordial 
flexibility of the term and its wide range of imbedded assumptions, it is 
more useful to describe how its historical conditions have changed than 
to  grind out definitions. Experimentalism, after all, was born in mod- 
ernism, where it still looks more intelligible as a concept. 
In the 1960s Clement Greenberg was said to have surveyed the rapidly 
expanding art scene with dismay, noting that everyone had become an 
avant-garde. Various groupings, or "schools," could still be identified, but 
they would mostly disappear in the seventies and eighties. After decades of 
radical attacks against the definition of art, a state of pluralism settled into 
place. And what, after all, could experimentalism mean in an age of plu- 
ralism? How would one recognize it? A customary motivation to experi- 
ment is the judgement that existing forms are inadequate, accompanied by 
the desire to supersede them, or at  least improve or modify them. But the 
central tenet of pluralism is that no method is inherently better or worse 
than any other. Judgements about artworks look no further than the needs 
of the individual work and its local conditions. The van Doesburgs, or 
Vertovs, making overarching claims about the historical relevance of their 
program of work, are extremely rare. Those that do are taken only as seri- 
ously as pluralism will allow. Pluralism is hegemonic, and forbids any par- 
ticular program under its endlessly expanding umbrella from having 
hegemonic ambitions. It's a meta-doctrine, the set of sets. 
Pluralism emerges when debates regarding basic historical and artistic 
principles become unresolvable. Pluralism can continue to tolerate such 
debates, provided that they continue to provide more evidence of plural- 
ism. But pluralism does not present the best conditions for such debates, 
and they will necessarily take a back seat to pluralism's proper vocation: 
proliferation and diversity in the absence of fixed categories. If no reign- 
ing doctrines are permissible, then there is no point in experimenting in 
order to find one; and if there are no grounds on which to claim that one 
program is better than another, there are diminishing rewards in trying to 
improve or replace existing methodologies or to improve on existing 
styles. Pluralism itself is non-utopian, even if utopianism, like anything 
else, can nonetheless carve out a position for itself among a constellation 
of other alternatives. This is one of the difficulties confronted by political 
experimentalisms, particularly those seeking to argue for their program- 
matic historical relevance and agency; pluralism is clearly a more conge- 
nial environment for some aesthetic ideas than others.4 
Experimentalism has lost some of the special status it once enjoyed 
while in the protective embrace of a modernism that believed in the future. 
It must now argue its case alongside, or perhaps in conjunction with, a 
more capricious pluralism. This does not mean that the great projects or 
claims of experimentalism-that it struggles against commodification, that 
it critiques reactionary forms of representation, that it invents new ways of 
thinking and wondering and expressing, that it throws its lot in with the 
struggle for personal, social and sexual freedoms, for example-are any 
less valid. But the skepticism about utopian goals isn't the only factor 
restricting the political scope of experimental work. Few doubt any more 
that the role that art plays in changing life and society varies from very 
small to negligible, and that to think otherwise is a "dangerous illusion."s 
Things can happen to knock pluralism from its currently ascendant 
position. A fatigue with pluralism, though, now expressed often enough 
from largely but not exclusively conservative quarters, seems unlikely to 
prevail; nor is the suspicion that the diversity (if not "permanent revolu- 
tion") thought to be constitutive of pluralism, appearing as it does in a 
highly institutionalized art world, is actually producing a bland neo-con- 
ceptual sameness. An historical trauma powerful enough to shock us into 
engaging more specific criteria and a more focussed zone of practice 
might be enough, although it seems now certain that September 11 was 
not that trauma. But pluralism is unlikely to be dislodged any time soon, 
for the simple reason that artists won't allow it. One can safely guess that 
most artists dislike some of its associated problems, not the least of which 
is the significant transfer of power from individual artists to institutions, 
curators, and programmers. Nonetheless, the prospect of returning to 
abstract expressionism-like hegemonies backed by Clement Greenberg- 
like critics armed with a few unyielding criteria is more than enough to 
compel artists to the ramparts. 
There are also several notable changes to the vocabulary of formal 
expression. One is the steep decline of self-reflexivity as a yardstick of crit- 
ical worth. It should be remembered that only thirty-five years ago, a 
major experimental approach, "structural" film, was built primarily on the 
scaffolding of this most eminent modernist principle. From its early articu- 
lations-the making strange of Viktor Shklovski or Brecht's alienation 
techniques, Vertov's Man With  A Movie Camera (1929) -self-reflexivity 
has been a stalwart ally in the ongoing defining of critical work, and has 
frequently played centre stage. Its largely ignominious fate is to have been 
shunted aside by one of its sub-categories, intertextuality, which, at least in 
its dominant Tarantino-like or David Letterman-like form, has been most 
successful in playing on its twin attributes of familiarity and recognition in 
the production of new stylistic pleasures. 
The surprising decline of self-reflexivity suggests that its critical legacy 
was overestimated in the first place; perhaps structural film burned up 
what little credit remained. Self-reflexivity, once critical by default, is now 
uncritical by default. Still, the very reason for its decline-the uncritically 
self-reflexive, self-parodying, vertiginously intertextual character of tele- 
vision and commercial cinema-might just as easily be construed as a rea- 
son for its renewed relevance. 
The fate of collage frames a second major transformation in the land- 
scape of experimentalism. This classically radical anti-realist innovation of 
the last century has become, with considerable historical irony, the realism 
of this one. Walter Benjamin's enthralling descriptions of a mind critically 
transformed by the shock and interruption of collage mean little to the 
contemporary consciousness for whom the formal conditions of such 
experiences are a familiar part of daily routine. Some more ambitious con- 
temporary works, of course, fulfil1 Benjamin's critical expectations (Abi- 
gail Child's Mayhem comes to mind). Yet like self-reflexivity, ninety years 
of familiarity has made the critical effects of collage praised by the mod- 
ernists considerably more difficult for contemporary artists to achieve. 
And the culture industry, again. The "integration of art into life" was a 
common modernist refrain, whose goals were explicitly associated with 
the progressive transformation of the political and social spheres. Even 
though these utopian projects, along with the avant-garde that spawned 
them, are now almost uniformly discredited, the integration of art and life 
-and the consequent assumption that the high artllow art barrier must 
be therefore expunged-remains highly persuasive. The reasons, however, 
are not those professed by the historical avant-garde. They range from a 
passion for popular culture and the artist's recognition of its profound 
cultural significance and influence, to  a dread of "elitism" and cultural 
ghettoization.6 The result, it is hoped, is a net increase in cultural democ- 
ratization. But because our democracy is everywhere constrained by its 
capitalist framework, some substance is given the growing alarm that art 
is being refashioned as a specialized branch of the entertainment indus- 
tries.' There have even been scattered reports of artists and theorists 
rereading Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Experimental art practice is not exactly science, but it's not exactly not 
science either. Buried within the obvious differences are surprising points 
of convergence. In standard scientific practice, an experiment is preceded 
by an hypothesis. The hypothesis is then verified-or not-by the experi- 
ment. Verification is usually desirable, but it is not the sole sign of suc- 
cess. Disproving an hypothesis may prove just as productive for a 
research program. There is disagreement about how important a role the 
hypothesis plays in the making of experiments-must it be specific and 
rigorous, or loose and heuristic in nature? Ian Hacking cites two contrary 
examples: the physicist George Darwin, who claimed that one should 
occasionally do a completely crazy experiment, like "blowing the trumpet 
to the tulips every morning for a month" in the hope that something 
unexpected might come of it; and Justus von Liebig, who said: "An exper- 
iment not preceded by theory, i.e. by an idea, bears the same relation to 
scientific research as a child's rattle does to music." (It's amusing to imag- 
ine how John Cage might have responded to von Liebig's analogy.) 
The chummy proximity of artwork and theory has been a familiar fea- 
ture of modernist and postmodernist art alike. Manifestos can be helpful, 
as they are often closer to the thought process of the artists themselves, 
but are by no means necessary. A good part of the theory guiding mod- 
ernist experimentalism was as experimental as the artistic practice it was 
guiding. Picasso spoke of his work with Braque as "laboratory research." 
They had ideas regarding what they wanted (reality should be in the 
painting, not the object) and what they didn't (Impressionism), and then 
made lots of paintings, in order to see what would come of it. Until 
recently, most of the theory that informed art-making was assumed to 
come largely from professional philosophers. Artists would read them (a 
weighty component of graduate art school training), and employ that 
research in any number of ways. This process was particularly prominent 
in the 1980s, but by the early nineties artists could be heard grumbling 
about the consequences of what looked like an alliance between unequals. 
It seemed that theoretical models (often the same ones) were continually 
trumping the artwork, which was then held up as evidence of an abstract 
metaphysical or psychoanalytic proposition. Academic writers used art- 
works-rich with ignored detail-as examples or illustrations of the theo- 
retical models they had worked so hard to master. It seems hardly 
surprising that artists would come to question this relationship; the "anti- 
intellectualism" often perceived among "young artists" is, in part, a wel- 
come reaction against this most anti-pluralistic state of affairs.8 
For the scientist, on the other hand, the experiment is linked to some- 
thing more modest and more local than a theory: an hypothesis. Rarely is 
any one experiment thought to be evidence enough to prove or disprove a 
theory. For that, a considerable amount of experimental data is necessary, 
requiring many experiments. Sometimes the theory only emerges long 
after a nexus of isolated, un-theorized experimental "laws" has been 
established.9 The experiments themselves, both artistic and scientific, are 
notable for their exacting and subtle attention to detail. To those for 
whom what really matters is the theory, the experiments that prove it or 
illustrate it are indeed subordinate. 
The more experimental of experimental artists, however, advance or 
embody hypotheses; they do not illustrate theories. Good criticism helps 
articulate these hypotheses by working with the concrete details, the 
minutiae of the artwork, and avoiding the reductive and refamiliarizing 
proclivities of pre-existing theory. The more appropriate analogy with sci- 
entific practice may be with the scientist's use of computer models, in 
which it is not always clear if the computer simulation designates the 
process of constructing an hypothesis, or the carrying out of an experi- 
ment. Similarly, the hypothesis-artwork form does not describe two tem- 
porally distinct stages, but two interdependent, CO-present parts of a 
larger process; the hypothesis emerges from the artwork as much as the 
artwork emerges from the hypothesis. 
Science too has its advocates of experimental pluralism. Paul Feyer- 
abend claims that there is no unifying method in science, but rather sci- 
ence is, and should be, a heuristic and open-ended amalgam of loosely 
associated procedures whose goal is not methodological clarity, but the 
production of scientific results."J This "epistemological anarchy," Feyer- 
abend claims, always was and still remains the natural state of science. 
Anthropology, to take a related example, is viewed quite differently by 
George Marcus and Michael Fischer.ll Like the human sciences in gen- 
eral, anthropology is roiled by fractious debates, which both occasion and 
are fuelled by increasing experimentation in written and visual ethno- 
graphic representation. But rather than a natural state, this experimental- 
ism is, according to Marcus and Fischer, temporary, a "period" situated 
"betwixt and between periods of more consolidated research conven- 
tions." Their concern is that this "moment" of experimentation in anthro- 
pology, crucial as it is for renewing a research apparatus whose larger 
project has lost much of its legitimacy, will be "foreclosed prematurely, 
that some experiments will be mistaken for models." According to this 
view, the "crisis of representation" which inflamed anthropology's cur- 
rent experimental period will be replaced by a renewed field of research, 
with a narrowed but more coherent array of methodological procedures. 
"The motivating spirit of experimentation," they claim, "is thus anti- 
genre." But once the "crisis" has been critically reflected in emerging 
methodologies, the need for experimentation will dissipate. In some 
areas, the goal of experimentation is to eliminate the conditions that pro- 
voked it into existence, as van Doesburg had once envisioned for progres- 
sive art. 
It's easy to identify two concepts of experimentalism in art practice. 
Experimentation-for-its-own-sake, not substantially different than what 
one might find in other endeavours that value the inherent qualities of the 
"creative process," like cooking, or marketing; and experimentalism as a 
genre, having some of the characteristics that anthropology entered a 
period of experimentation precisely to expunge. Neither of these forms 
foresee a self-annihilating moment of consummation, nor are they roused 
to action by the prospects of attaining specific goals. 
But these two cases don't exhaust the matter. There remains the ques- 
tion of art's self-transformation. Pluralism or not, there are many artists 
who think about the consequences of their practice for Art. The parame- 
ters of one's practice can be as much the object of aesthetic reception as 
the art object itself. Whether working with unions, or tucked away in the 
solitary confines of one's studio, the model or the process of art produc- 
tion matters; it's the hidden programmatic nature of artistic desire.12 For 
now, they all get a predictably pluralist twist-each one is chalked up as 
just another art practice in the wacky world of anything-goes. But it's 
possible that the currents of art's self-transformation are more powerful 
than is presently recognized. If so, the familiar insouciance of pluralism 
may experience disruptive energies it cannot so easily envelope. 
No single theory is capable of encompassing the vast body of experi- 
mentalist work. There are, though, lots of fine, tentative techniques and 
motivating hypotheses, which are to be found in great abundance among 
artists' statements and commentaries, even if one suspects that further 
analysis would show them to conform to just a few general archetypes. 
Like their counterparts in the academic world they always evoke themes 
of play, regeneration, or the production of the new. Here are two exam- 
ples, one from a source quite obscure, the other prominent. 
The first is from Alexius Meinong, a German phenomenologist and 
experimental psychologist, found principally in his book of 1905, On 
Assumptions. The "assumption" is part of a larger set of terms which 
includes "ideas," "judgements," and "surmises," but it is against the 
"judgement" that the experimental character of the assumption best 
emerges. To judge, said Meinong, is to be convinced of something, to 
believe. Furthermore, to judge is to be convinced of something definite; a 
thing has or has not a particular property; it is, or is not, good. To judge 
is to be possessed of conviction. To assume, on the other hand, is also to 
take a definite position, but unlike the judgement, one does so without 
conviction. We provisionally "take" something to be the case, quite inde- 
pendently of whether we actually believe it to be the case. 
The importance of the assumption to thought as well as play is immedi- 
ately apparent. Assumptions are experimental in nature, permitting one to 
momentarily bracket conviction in order to see where the experimental 
moment might lead. Assumptions cannot then be wrong in an orthodox 
sense, although they can be unproductive. Meinong thought that the 
assumption was essential in order to explain practices like art and chil- 
dren's play. The thinker says, "let's assume that such and such is the 
case," in order to test an hypothesis; the child says, "let's pretend that 
such and such is the case" in order to test an experience. When reading a 
novel, we assume that certain characters do certain things in certain ways; 
we assume, while having no conviction about the existence of what we 
are assuming. The attitude of assuming, Meinong says, "...is not influ- 
enced in the slightest by the presence of a contrary conviction." 
By requiring that we momentarily set aside personal conviction, assum- 
ing allows us to  occupy the position of someone other than ourselves. 
Assumptions are, in Meinong's words, "imaginary beliefs." Even though 
we do not believe, we agree to either occupy the position of someone who 
does, or pretend for a time that we ourselves are someone who holds a 
particular belief. 
Any combination of assumptions and judgements is possible in an art- 
work, and the viewer can then in turn either assume or judge what they 
find there. But conviction is rarely absent for long. According to a famil- 
iar model of reception, assumptions, whatever else they do, are there to 
serve judgements. The assumption does its job, and conviction is restored. 
One goal of the assumption is to improve the quality of our judgements. 
In either case, whether the work's form of expression is organized princi- 
pally around the judgement or the assumption, there is typically judge- 
ment-in-the-last-instance, for as Meinong points out, there undoubtedly 
exists a bias in favour of conviction. 
But it is not always clear if what one perceives in the work are themselves 
assumptions or judgements; that is, the viewer may not know if conviction 
is present or not, and this ambiguity can have important implications for 
the work's reception. Some experimental works inhibit the conversion of 
assumptions into judgements, in order to prolong and enhance the activity 
of assuming among viewers. The purpose of using the assumption as a 
form of expression, in this case, is not to promote higher quality judge- 
ments, but higher quality assumptions. The viewer is asked to pretend bet- 
ter, in order to explore other possibilities for living and thinking. 
Artists develop strategies for blocking the premature formation of 
judgements. A common one is the careful use of abstract relations. If one 
juxtaposes a chair and a table, the relation is perceived as "natural." The 
relation between a chair and a rock, however, is abstract, provided that 
their association is given no explanation. The presence of abstract rela- 
tions has a corrosive effect on conviction. A fine example is Luis Bufiuel's 
The Exterminating Angel. The haute bourgeoisie of Mexico City convene 
in a palatial home for an after-opera soiree. For reasons that are never 
explained, the guests are unable to leave the dining hall; a hidden force 
prevents them from walking through an otherwise open doorway. Much 
fun is then had at the expense of the upper classes, whose good breeding 
quickly evaporates. Then a bear appears, ambling inexplicably through a 
lower passageway. Is this a reference to the "Soviet Union," as some com- 
mentators, requiring that the bear mean something, have wondered? Who 
knows; Buiiuel's films have never fit well with the symbolism of the Euro- 
pean art film. Certainly the shock of the bear's appearance sends a ripple 
of humorously abstract uncertainty through the film. Doorways which are 
not doorways and impertinent bears are enough to keep the film's 
assumptions in play. 
A second example comes from the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who 
produces and himself embodies an image of the joyful, experimental life. 
"Experiment," he said, "never interpret."13 He would have been dismayed 
to see Buiiuel's beautiful bear, freed to stray into unexpected places, re- 
caged as a symbol, and he defended the works of many artists against 
such domesticating responses. Deleuze's balance sheet of agreement with 
general contemporary tendencies is mixed. He rejects all avant-gardes, 
which would find little disagreement in the contemporary art world; but 
he also rejects genres (the contemporary equivalent of artistic "schools"), 
which would receive stiff resistance. But it is Deleuze who has made it 
possible to talk about that old modernist ally the "new" again without 
blushing. Keeping the disciplines distinct, philosophers invent new "con- 
cepts," while artists invent new "affects." Experimentation produces the 
"...new, remarkable, and interesting," which replaces "the appearance of 
truth" and is "more demanding than it [truth] is."14 One should not solve 
problems, as do those whose concern is the truth, but continually formu- 
late new problems. So free must the experimenters be from existing pat- 
terns of thought and morality that they will have "no principles."l3 
Accordingly, this process of experimentation is "non-dialectical"; one is 
not to advance into the new by discursively critiquing existing positions, 
concepts, or methods in order to refute them. That would be "reactive." 
The experimentalist, on the other hand, creates the new, and is therefore 
"active." The reactive-dialectical process of critique and refutation is 
designed to eliminate ideas understood to be flawed, an evaluative proce- 
dure which is necessarily predicated on judgement. The familiar questions 
of who judges and according to which foundational rules emerge once 
more. But such tired problems cannot penetrate the Nietzschean heights of 
the Deleuzian experimental world, which, resembling children's play as it 
does, is not predicated on communication. It is a ludic model; the goal is 
not communication, but creation. This resembles in turn many artists' 
work, the reception of which is often distorted by the mistaken assumption 
that because it is an artwork, its primary desire must be to say something. 
The Deleuzian experimental process shares many superficial similarities 
with pluralism, particularly the perpetual addition of new ideas 
(...and.. .and...and..., as Deleuze says), proliferating in a critique-free 
landscape. This resemblance is unfortunate, as Deleuze's experiments are 
both rigorous and politically subtle. Articulating the distinctions between 
today's pluralism and Deleuze's experimentalism, on the other hand, 
could be very helpful to those wishing to sort out, critically, what is worth 
keeping and what isn't in our current environment. But Deleuze's 
approach raises many questions, some of which are quite familiar. Is it 
only available to the Nietzschean few? Is this just another in a series of 
unrealizable avant-garde utopian overtures? Or even when successful 
instances appear, is the frenetic world of pluralism just too unfavorable 
an environment for such experiments to come fully into view? 
Yet Deleuze's optimism notwithstanding, it's difficult to fathom how 
any of the experimental desires currently expressed by artists can be mate- 
rially realized in the social sphere without a lot more critical self-reflec- 
tion than is presently talung place. This is clearly true of the anti-capitalist 
experimentalisms, which carry a tradition of political art as symbolic of 
an ideal social field. But so unstable is the current environment that even 
the corporate-friendly, innovation-for-its-own-sake artists can't rely on 
their accommodationist conservatism and their "thinking-outside-the- 
box" talk to open doors automatically for them. The corporate world is 
plenty experimental in its own right, and has limited use for "artists." 
And where are the critics? There are many disappointed ones wandering 
around, disappointed either that the avant-garde failed, or that it was so 
embarrassingly deluded to begin with. Another type has become exasper- 
ated with what remains of the avant-garde's political project. For these lat- 
ter critics, artists who talk politics, particularly socialist politics, have 
crossed a threshold of self-exile, joining a motley group composed of anti- 
globalization protesters, and social critics like Noam Chomsky and 
Edward Said, who just aren't getting with the new program. Ha1 Foster has 
identified another category, the "poet-critic," which has filled the void left 
by the decline of the more politicized approaches of the "Artforum critic" 
and the "October critic" (of which he was one) in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The new poet-critic "waxes lyrical about the necessary return of Beauty 
and Spirituality as the essential objects of art."16 Foster observes that the 
decline of the earlier forms of critique were displaced by "a new nexus of 
dealers, collectors and curators for whom critical evaluation, let alone the- 
oretical analysis, was of little use. Indeed, these things were usually deemed 
an obstruction, and many managers of art actively shun them, as do many 
artists, sadly enough."l7 Experimentalism presently covers both sides of 
this spiritual/critical divide. Perhaps it's time for some debate. 
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